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PROACTIVE REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS’ 
OFFICES:  STRENGTHENING DISCIPLINARY 
COMMITTEES’ OVERSIGHT OF PROSECUTORS’ 
OFFICES ACROSS THE UNITED STATES WITH 
ABA MODEL RULE 5.1 
Caitlyn B. Holuta* 
 
In the United States, there are currently several mechanisms to deter 
prosecutorial misconduct, including judicial orders, civil litigation by 
defendants, enforcement actions by disciplinary authorities, and internal 
discipline within a prosecutor’s office.  Despite these many avenues of 
oversight, none have successfully prevented misconduct to the degree society 
demands.  Several international legal systems have adopted regulatory 
frameworks based on the theory of proactive management-based regulation, 
which mitigates against unethical conduct by requiring attorneys to self-
assess their internal ethics policies against a rubric of ethics goals set by 
ethics and disciplinary authorities.  While most U.S. jurisdictions have not 
adopted proactive management-based regulations, attorneys are required by 
state-enacted versions of American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 5.1 to maintain internal policies that guarantee ethical 
practices in their offices.  This Note argues that disciplinary committees 
should meaningfully enforce ABA Model Rule 5.1 by utilizing a proactive 
regulatory approach.  By requiring prosecutors to self-assess and report 
whether their office policies guarantee ethical prosecutions and prevent 
misconduct, disciplinary committees can safeguard against prosecutorial 
misconduct more than current efforts.  Proactive enforcement of Model Rule 
5.1 allows disciplinary committees to move beyond a defensive, ex post 
approach to misconduct and, instead, utilize preventative measures that 
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INTRODUCTION 
A 1999 study by the Chicago Tribune investigated whether prosecutors’ 
offices disciplined their own line prosecutors for misconduct.1  The study 
 
 1. Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error Part 2:  The Flip Side of a Fair 
Trial, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 1999), https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/chi-
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found that of the 381 reversals on appeal in homicide cases in the prior thirty-
seven years, of which sixty-seven were death penalty cases, only one 
prosecutor was disciplined for misconduct.2  This prosecutor was reinstated 
with back pay after he appealed his firing.3  Only one attorney received an 
in-house suspension, which only lasted thirty days.4  A third attorney had his 
license suspended for fifty-nine days, but this was due to unrelated errors in 
the case.5  None of these attorneys received public sanction.6 
In the United States, the prosecutor’s charge is “to see that justice is 
done,”7 and it is as much a prosecutor’s duty to “refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one.”8  Prosecutors wield tremendous 
and unique power in our legal system.  This power includes the ability to 
imprison people and deprive them of freedom and property, stigmatize 
people as criminals, and cause people to incur legal fees to defend 
themselves.  However, the responsibility that comes with this power is not 
always appropriately managed.9  Although most prosecutors likely aim to 
responsibly discharge their duties, when individual prosecutors practice 
without a clear understanding of the rules, negligently discharge their duties, 
or intentionally prioritize conviction rates over justice, they deprive 
defendants of their constitutional rights to due process.10  When this power 
goes unchecked, violations can go unpunished and a culture of improper 
prosecutions inevitably persists, even when prosecutors are found guilty of 
flagrant misconduct.11 
In one case study, attorney Joel Rudin uncovered a litany of misconduct 
during a series of § 1983 cases against various New York district attorneys’ 
offices.12  Discovery in a civil case against the Bronx County District 
Attorney’s Office, in which Rudin sued over the office’s “deliberate[] 
indifferen[ce] to its constitutional obligations,” revealed the disciplinary 
 
020103trial2-story.html [https://perma.cc/TY3W-KUBE]; see also Joel B. Rudin, The 
Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar:  
Three Case Studies That Prove That Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 546–54 
(2011). 
 2. Possley & Armstrong, supra note 1. 
 3. Rudin, supra note 1, at 542. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011). 
 8. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (describing a prosecutor’s duties as 
“not [those duties] of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation 
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done”). 
 9. See, e.g., Rudin, supra note 1. 
 10. See id. at 553. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See, e.g., id. 
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records, salaries, and evaluations of prosecutors involved in seventy-two 
misconduct cases.13 
These records demonstrated that in the seventy-two cases of misconduct 
in the office’s trials, only one prosecutor had been disciplined and only after 
he had been accused of prosecutorial misconduct in multiple trials.14  Further, 
he and thirteen other prosecutors had been involved in more than one incident 
of misconduct.  One other prosecutor, who was not disciplined, had been 
judicially reprimanded for misconduct in four trials, while a third prosecutor 
had been reprimanded in five trials.15  The sole prosecutor who was 
disciplined received a deduction of four weeks of pay.16  However, after his 
return, he promptly received a raise and a bonus, more than compensating for 
his lost wages.17  Despite the prosecutor receiving two subsequent 
reprimands and referrals for disciplinary action, the Bronx District 
Attorney’s Office doubled that prosecutor’s salary over the next four years.18  
The only negative comment on his evaluation was related to repeated 
tardiness; however, he was simultaneously lauded for his “[t]remendous 
ability to plead def[endan]ts with the weakest proof.”19  The only mention of 
the judicial reprimand in his evaluation was as a justification for his decline 
in productivity.20 
This case study illustrates the systemic inadequacies that allow 
prosecutorial misconduct to carry on without any serious oversight or 
reform.21  Moreover, this case study is only one example among many that 
demonstrate how internal self-regulation by prosecutors’ offices is largely 
discretionary.22  Regulatory authorities likely permit prosecutors to self-
regulate because:  (1) they believe that prosecutors generally uphold a higher 
ethical standard than other attorneys, and (2) state ethics rules require law 
offices to maintain internal policies guaranteeing adequate training to prevent 
repeated misconduct.23  However, all too frequent prosecutorial misconduct 
illuminates the problematic lack of oversight or enforcement of state ethics 
rules in prosecutors’ offices.24 
To that end, this Note suggests that disciplinary committees adopt a 
proactive approach to prosecutorial regulation and innovatively apply the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 5.1.  This proactive approach would utilize a self-reporting structure to 
 
 13. Id. at 538, 549–50. 
 14. Id. at 550. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. at 550–51. 
 17. See id. at 551. 
 18. See id. at 550–51. 
 19. Id. at 551–52 (second alteration in original) (quoting personnel records disclosed in 
discovery taken in Ramos v. City of New York, No. 21770/93, 1999 WL 35015447 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 1999)). 
 20. Id. at 551. 
 21. See, e.g., id. 
 22. See infra Part I.A. 
 23. See infra Part I.A. 
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
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guarantee that prosecutors’ offices do in fact maintain “measures giving 
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”25 
Part I of this Note addresses the mechanisms that currently regulate 
prosecutors, such as judicial orders and sanctions, civil liability against 
prosecutors’ offices with rampant misconduct, retroactive sanctioning by 
disciplinary committees, and internal reprimands and discipline according to 
an office’s own policies.26  Part I also explains what the universally adopted 
ABA Model Rule 5.1 demands of supervisory lawyers.  Part II details the 
proactive management-based systems (PMBR) that have frequently been 
employed in international legal systems to promote attorney accountability.27  
Part III examines how increased active enforcement and oversight of state-
adopted versions of Model Rule 5.1, through proactive regulation, might 
enable disciplinary authorities to successfully deter prosecutorial misconduct 
and examines the obstacles that could arise from this application.28  Part III 
also urges the adoption of proactive regulation that would require 
prosecutors’ offices to report their policies safeguarding against misconduct 
to disciplinary authorities.29 
I.  CURRENT AVENUES OF OVERSIGHT AND RECOURSE FOR 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Recent court opinions and academic scholarship have found that 
prosecutorial misconduct is frequent enough to justify more oversight and 
regulation.  Although to say that prosecutors need more oversight implies 
that prosecutorial misconduct is a systemic problem—which does not of 
course mean that every prosecutor’s office around the country is rife with 
malicious prosecutions, Brady violations, and untruthful prosecution 
witnesses30—the easy answer to this misconduct is to say “regulate the 
lawyers,” which, of course, already occurs.31  Part I.A reviews how 
prosecutors are currently checked in several ways, including by judicial 
orders, disciplinary counsel, and § 1983 civil litigation brought by criminal 
defendants.32  These types of regulations, however, are often either 
 
 25. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 26. See infra Part I. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See infra Part III. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. 
Thompson:  Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. F. 203, 205 (2011) (“Our findings, based on an 
investigation into the professional conduct rules and attorney discipline procedures of all fifty 
states, suggest that disciplinary systems as they are currently constituted do a poor job of 
policing prosecutors.”); Matt Ferner, Prosecutors Are Almost Never Disciplined for 
Misconduct, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/prosecutor-
misconduct-justice_n_56bce00fe4b0c3c55050748a [https://perma.cc/2URU-Y2L7]. 
 31. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence:  Overrated or 
Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 602–03 (2013). 
 32. See infra Part I.A. 
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inconsistently or rarely applied and, therefore, do not adequately prevent 
prosecutorial misconduct.33  Part I.B reviews how state disciplinary 
committees serve an enforcement and investigatory function that monitors 
compliance with the ethics rules adopted in each state.  Part I.B also discusses 
how ethics authorities in every state already have a tool in Model Rule 5.1 to 
hold managerial attorneys accountable for their offices’ ethics compliance.34 
A.  Prosecutorial Misconduct and Preventative Mechanisms in the United 
States 
The current ex post punitive and deterrent measures designed to prevent 
prosecutorial misconduct are insufficient.35  These efforts include judicial 
oversight of attorneys who practice before the courts, civil rights litigation 
that criminal defendants can bring when prosecutors have violated their due 
process rights to a fair trial, and disciplinary actions by judicially created 
disciplinary committees that enforce state-adopted rules of professional 
conduct. 
As judges are the agents of authority who most publicly regulate 
prosecutors, experts generally use judicial opinions to assess the frequency 
of prosecutorial misconduct.36  Judges employ several tools to regulate 
lawyers and provide prosecutorial oversight.37  One way that judges 
discipline attorneys is by admonishing or reprimanding them by name in 
judicial opinions.38  Besides embarrassment before the bar and “public 
opprobrium for improper conduct,” however, this type of sanctioning cannot 
lead to professional discipline unless there is clear evidence that the conduct 
violated an ethics rule.39  Judicial opinions usually do not result in any 
accompanying reform or guaranteed change in behavior.40  Rather, this 
disciplinary tactic relies on the assumption that prosecutors will be shamed 
 
 33. See Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a 
Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion:  A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 156–57 (2016). 
 34. See infra Part I.B. 
 35. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (reversing judgment and 
awarding fourteen million dollars to an innocent man on death row who was improperly found 
guilty after prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence); United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 
844, 862 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[T]here has over a substantial period of time . . . [been] a pattern 
of conduct or misconduct of not presenting evidence until very late, many times during the 
trial.” (third alteration in original) (quoting trial court record)); United States v. Modica, 663 
F.2d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (“We thus find ourselves in a situation with which 
this Court is all too familiar:  a prosecutor has delivered an improper summation, despite this 
Court’s oft-expressed concern over the frequency with which improper prosecution 
summations occur.”).  See generally State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 309 P.3d 108 
(Okla. 2013) (characterizing a series of prior violations by a prosecutor who committed Brady 
violations, elicited false testimony, and engaged in other unethical actions as “improper,” 
“inappropriate,” and “egregious”). 
 36. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 156–57. 
 37. See, e.g., In re Riehlmann, 891 So.2d 1239, 1241–42 (La. 2005); In re Schuessler, 578 
S.W.3d 762, 775–76 (Mo. 2019) (en banc); see also Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149. 
 38. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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by courts into correcting their behavior, which may be undermined if 
supervising attorneys supported the sanctioned actions.41  Further, appellate 
courts usually only investigate misconduct if the misconduct prejudiced a 
defendant.42  If there was misconduct but no prejudice, courts uphold the trial 
court verdict and may not sanction the prosecutor’s offense.43  Alternatively, 
judges may refer an attorney to the disciplinary committee in a given 
jurisdiction to investigate the attorney and the extent of the misconduct.44 
Still, judicial regulation is often inconsistent, both in severity and 
frequency, and therefore is not an effective deterrent.45  Traditionally, courts 
have trusted prosecutors to act ethically so much so that prosecutorial 
integrity has sometimes been elevated “to the level of a legal presumption.”46 
Recently, though, courts have been more willing to acknowledge 
prosecutorial misconduct than in previous decades, and today’s judges are 
more likely to admonish attorneys in their opinions and refer prosecutors to 
disciplinary committees.47  Even though courts now generally recognize the 
problem of misconduct, they are still reluctant to discipline prosecutors 
themselves.48  Courts may be comfortable identifying misconduct but 
traditionally are not willing to regularly impose sanctions, despite 
acknowledging the significance of the prosecutor’s role.49  This may be 
because of the general respect courts have for prosecutors, as in Imbler v. 
Pachtman,50 where the U.S. Supreme Court observed that a “prosecutor 
stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of 
constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an 
 
 41. See id. 
 42. See Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 51, 64 (2016). 
 43. See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1563, 1565 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(“Improper prosecutorial comments require reversal only if the comments substantially 
affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial. . . .  Taking the trial as a whole, we conclude that 
the prosecutor’s closing argument does not cast ‘serious doubt,’ upon the correctness of the 
jury verdict or the fairness of the trial.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Willis, 6 
F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1993))); United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(observing that “dismissing an indictment is a disfavored remedy” unless the conduct was 
“patently egregious”); United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that 
dismissal is only appropriate when prosecutorial misconduct is “flagrant”). 
 44. See, e.g., In re Schuessler, 578 S.W.3d 762, 775–76 (Mo. 2019) (en banc); In re Rook, 
556 P.2d 1351, 1355–56 (Or. 1976) (en banc) (requesting that the disciplinary committee 
discipline an attorney for “animosity and a desire to punish”). 
 45. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149–50 (“[C]ourts have interpreted generally 
applicable ethics rules differently—sometimes more restrictively, and sometimes less so—in 
addressing prosecutors’ conduct.”). 
 46. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 54. 
 47. Id. at 73–75. 
 48. See id. at 62–63 (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2001) (per 
curiam), as failing to identify the prosecutor throughout the opinion); see, e.g., United States 
v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993) (naming the prosecutor more than forty times in the 
initial opinion but withdrawing the name in the final opinion despite strongly condemning the 
prosecutor’s actions); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam). 
 49. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976); Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1424–25. 
 50. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
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association of his peers.”51  Alternatively, it may be because judges feel as 
though it is more appropriate to leave discipline to prosecutors’ offices to 
handle misconduct internally.52  Judicial regulation of prosecutors, however, 
does not often require prosecutors’ offices or disciplinary committees to 
follow up with the court to report on what sanctioning they deemed 
appropriate.  This allows prosecutors’ offices that do not agree with the courts 
to avoid enforcing the judiciary’s admonishments.53 
When a court is not willing to undertake the task of disciplining attorneys 
on its own, criminal defendants can bring civil rights litigation for redress as 
another way to check prosecutors.54  However, when defendants prejudiced 
by misconduct use the legal system to seek recourse or obtain financial 
remedies, their cases often fail because of absolute prosecutorial immunity.55  
Prosecutorial immunity protects an individual prosecutor’s acts performed 
within the scope of the prosecutor’s duties.56  A prior criminal defendant who 
believes there was unethical misconduct in the prosecution, alternatively, can 
bring a § 1983 claim in federal court against the municipality or government 
agency (i.e., prosecutors’ offices) for deprivation of the constitutional right 
to due process.57  However, defendants only prevail on § 1983 claims if they 
sue the municipality where the conviction occurred and prove that the 
prosecutor’s office was “deliberately indifferent”58 to the “constitutional 
obligations” to train, supervise, or discipline its agents or employees.59 
Furthermore, any finding of § 1983 liability only provides the criminal 
defendant remuneration or redress from the municipality and does not lead 
to any corrective or punitive action against the specific prosecutor whose 
error was at issue in the lawsuit.60  This shift towards institutional liability 
properly places at least some degree of blame on upper-level management 
and its failure to train employees but often does not vindicate the criminal 
 
 51. Id. at 429. 
 52. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 73–74 (citing Jason Ryan, Sen. Ted Stevens 
Prosecutors Hide Evidence, Report Concludes, ABC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/sen-ted-stevens-prosecutors-hid-evidence-
report-concludes [https://perma.cc/J4C5-Y6JD]) (referring to Judge Emmet Sullivan’s 
decision to appoint special prosecutors to examine the conduct of the prosecutors who tried 
U.S. Senator Ted Stevens). 
 53. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149. 
 54. See generally Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 56–57 (2011); Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
 55. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 64. 
 56. See id.; see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–25. 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Connick, 563 U.S. at 60; Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. 
 58. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (“[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, 
requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his 
action.” (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 
410 (1997))). 
 59. Id. at 61 (“When city policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular 
omission in their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional 
rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain 
that program.”); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297–98, 300–01 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 60. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 64. 
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defendant who was unfairly prosecuted.61  Further, judicial determinations 
of liability are unlikely to lead to significant reform.  A government agency 
will only make changes if it is sufficiently incentivized to implement 
reformative measures instead of paying future damages for § 1983 claims.  A 
government agency, therefore, will only make changes in policies if it 
determines that the risk of a future lawsuit and the resulting financial burden 
of § 1983 damages is greater than the cost of implementing training programs 
or hiring new management. 
B.  Disciplinary Committees’ Current Use of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct to Regulate Prosecutors 
In the United States, bar associations and state supreme courts adopt 
professional codes of ethics, usually titled “Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”62  These rules outline ethical ideals and practices that all lawyers 
in the corresponding jurisdiction are legally obligated to follow.63  Most state 
rules mirror the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are 
developed and promulgated by the ABA.64  Attorneys are instructed to treat 
this code as the bar’s ideals of “optimal professional norms” and to use the 
code, comments to the code, and ABA opinions as resources to help deal with 
ethical dilemmas and conflicting obligations.65 
Codes of conduct are enforceable today through state court imprimaturs, 
which authorize state supreme courts to issue rules that set forth professional 
guidelines for lawyers practicing in a jurisdiction.66  These codes are meant 
to reflect each court’s views on professional conduct but often are enacted 
verbatim from the ABA Model Rules.67  These codes, therefore, are 
judicially created laws binding on attorneys who practice within a 
jurisdiction.68  Despite the fact that the codes are adopted as mandatory rules 
and guidance for attorneys, court opinions offer conflicting conceptions of 
the purpose and force of state ethics rules.  Some courts believe that ethics 
rules are binding, “reflect the public policy of the state,”69 and “have the force 
and effect of substantive law, and ‘govern’ the conduct of lawyers who 
appear before them.”70  However, others opine that, while ethics codes 
 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Green, supra note 31, at 602–06. 
 63. See id.; Ted Schneyer, The Case for Proactive Management-Based Regulation to 
Improve Professional Self-Regulation for U.S. Lawyers, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 234 (2013). 
 64. See Green, supra note 31, at 603. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of 
Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 92–91, 110 (2009); see also CHRISTOPHER REINHART & GEORGE 
COPPOLO, OFF. OF LEGIS. RSCH., CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OLR RESEARCH REPORT:  COURT 
RULES IN OTHER STATES—LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL (2008), https://www.cga.ct.gov/ 
2008/rpt/2008-R-0430.htm [https://perma.cc/BMW2-ZS43]. 
 67. Zacharias & Green, supra note 66, at 93. 
 68. Id. at 110. 
 69. RICHARD E. FLAMM, LAWYERS DISQUALIFICATION:  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND 
OTHER BASES § 1.3 (1st ed. 2003). 
 70. Id.; see, e.g., In re Wallace, 574 So.2d 348, 350 (La. 1991) (“The standards governing 
the conduct of attorneys by rules of this court unquestionably have the force and effect of 
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provide guidance, courts are not required to adjudicate as though ethics codes 
have the binding force of law.71 
To help enforce these ethics rules, courts also have the authority to create 
disciplinary committees that implement and enforce the code.72  While 
disciplinary committees have enforcement power, their actions are confined 
to ex post solutions that are designed to have deterrent effects.73  Disciplinary 
committees usually hear a case after it has been referred to their offices by 
the courts or another attorney; disciplinary offices are usually not ferreting 
out misconduct to punish.74  Instead, if misconduct is egregious enough and 
surfaces in court before a judge, then disciplinary counsel will investigate 
and take appropriate action.75  Although disciplinary committees issue rules 
and opinions, most currently do not prevent misconduct or regulate 
prosecutors proactively.76 
Even though they are given this authority to act, statistically, disciplinary 
committees rarely bring actions against prosecutors’ offices.77  They, like the 
courts, regularly rely on internal office disciplinary actions or resort to either 
private or public admonishments.78  While these admonishments are a stain 
on a lawyer’s reputation within the legal field, clients and other attorneys 
often do not learn about any individual attorney’s sanctions.  If the 
admonishing court elects to issue the admonishment privately, then not only 
are the sanctions concealed from other clients or attorneys but other courts or 
judges will not know about prior misconduct that could affect the severity of 
 
substantive law.”); Post v. Bregman, 707 A.2d 806, 816 (Md. 1998) (“[Maryland Lawyers’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct] constitutes a statement of public policy by the only entity in 
this State having the Constitutional authority to make such a statement, and it has the force of 
law.”). 
 71. Katz v. Usdan (In re Est. of Weinstock), 351 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1976) (opining 
that ethics codes do not have “the status of decisional or statutory law”). 
 72. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §§ 2.2, 2.6, 3.2 (1986) 
(discussing the history and evolution of the disciplinary committee process and enforcement 
mechanisms).  For a history of lawyer regulation in the United States, see Fred C. Zacharias, 
The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
 73. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 81. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id.  But see Erika Kubik, Illinois Becomes First Jurisdiction to Adopt PMBR, 
2CIVILITY (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.2civility.org/illinois-becomes-first-state-adopt-pmbr 
[https://perma.cc/N5R7-TPFP]. 
 77. See, e.g., Ferner, supra note 30; Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 393, 444–45 (1992) (documenting the failure of disciplinary bodies to act against 
prosecutors and giving reasons); Charles E. MacLean & Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in 
the Quiver:  Mapping the Contours of Prosecutorial Discretion, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 81 
(2012) (highlighting “the small number of sanctions against prosecutors, relative to lawyers 
as a whole”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
721, 725 (2001) (describing the “rarity” with which prosecutors are disciplined); Comm. on 
Evaluation of Disciplinary Enf’t, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 
18, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/report_ 
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claims that the codes have been violated and assuming a need for disciplinary authorities to 
set priorities). 
 78. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 149. 
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future sanctions.  These verbal admonishments are often toothless and the 
recipient lawyer may not feel any consequences of their misconduct 
professionally.79 
Disciplinary committees historically act retrospectively and respond to 
complaints by clients who believe their lawyers inadequately performed their 
jobs as attorneys.  These clients often do not claim that their attorney’s 
inadequacy was because of a lack of firm infrastructure or proactive policies, 
and therefore it is up to disciplinary committees to determine whether the 
complaint arose from individual negligence or a systemic failure.80  
However, disciplinary committees have not traditionally investigated firm-
wide policies or taken enforcement action against managers, supervisors, or 
partners who violate Model Rules 5.1(a) or 5.3(a).81  This is particularly 
problematic because the result is that there is no incentive for managerial 
lawyers to fulfil their ethical managerial obligations.82 
1.  Model Rule 5.1:  Current Use and Shortcomings 
The ABA, in developing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
recognized that there were two types of rules that lawyers should follow:  (1) 
“first-order duties” that run directly to clients, tribunals, the profession, 
certain third parties and the public; and (2) “second-order duties,” which 
require lawyers to exert managerial authority and take measures against other 
lawyers in their practices and against nonlawyers who work alongside the 
attorneys.83 
Every state, under constitutional or legislative authority, has adopted a 
version of Model Rule 5.1.84  Model Rule 5.1(a) states that a lawyer who 
“possesses comparable managerial authority [to that of a partner] in a law 
firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect 
 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Schneyer, supra note 63, at 259 (stating that “[m]ost [complaints] are filed by 
unsophisticated clients against sole practitioners and small firm lawyers, complainants who 
are unlikely to specify any ethics rules as the basis for their allegations” and proposing that 
violations of Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3 are only brought to disciplinary committees’ attention 
when one firm has several complaints filed against it). 
 81. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 874 
(1992) (finding that a significant percentage of disciplinary complaints involved “low-level” 
agency problems and misconduct that could have been addressed with implemented and 
enforced office policies). 
 82. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 127 (2005). 
 83. Second-order rules promulgated by the ABA include Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3.  Model 
Rule 5.1(a) states “a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses 
comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm 
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2018).  Model Rule 5.3(a) states “a partner, and a lawyer who individually or 
together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable 
assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the 
lawyer.” Id. r. 5.3; Schneyer, supra note 63, at 253. 
 84. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 66, at 92, 110. 
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measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to 
the Rules of Professional Conduct.”85  Additionally, Model Rule 5.1(c)(2) 
states that a lawyer is responsible for another lawyer’s violation if the lawyer 
has sufficient managerial responsibility or direct supervisory authority over 
another lawyer who “knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences 
can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.”86 
There is no question that the Model Rules apply to prosecutors—in fact 
Model Rule 3.8 specifically spells out the special responsibilities of 
prosecutors.87  Additionally, there is no carveout in Model Rule 5.1 that 
removes its application to prosecutors’ offices—in fact, the ABA has 
specifically issued a formal opinion on this topic.88 
The ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility’s Formal Opinion 467 specifically outlines the “basic 
requirements” that the committee believes managers in prosecutors’ offices 
have as obligations.89  These obligations include establishing office-wide 
policies regarding concerns about confidentiality, conflicts of interest, dates 
and deadlines in pending matters, and supervision of inexperienced 
lawyers.90  The opinion treats Model Rule 3.8(d) and Brady obligations as 
interchangeable and specifically highlights that supervising attorneys must 
ensure that subordinate attorneys are sufficiently trained in this area.91 
Most significantly, however, the opinion specifically says that internal 
office procedures must facilitate compliance with the state-adopted version 
of the Model Rules.92  The ABA also asserts that, while these basic 
obligations are essential, because prosecutors must wrestle with “intensely 
difficult ethics issues,” offices may require more elaborate policies in order 
to comply with the obligations of Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3.93 
The comments to Model Rule 5.1 also state that the rule universally applies 
to government agencies and offices, not just private law firms.94  Even 
though there have not been any enforcement actions against prosecutors’ 
offices who fail to fulfill their Model Rule 5.1 obligations, historic 
nonenforcement does not bar enforcement today. 
2.  Internal Discipline as a Form of Redress for Prosecutorial Misconduct 
As previously stated, when courts identify prosecutorial misconduct, they 
often request that the office discipline its own employees.95  While in theory 
this may seem sufficient, investigations have proven that in many cases, 
 
 85. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1(a). 
 86. Id. r. 5.1(c)(2). 
 87. Id. r. 3.8. 
 88. Id. r. 5.1; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 467, at 8–10 (2014). 
 89. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 467, at 8–10. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 1–2. 
 92. Id. at 8. 
 93. Id. (citing In re Myers, 584 S.E.2d 357, 360–61 (S.C. 2003)). 
 94. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 95. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 175–76. 
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prosecutors’ offices do not create systematic and methodical disciplinary 
guides.96 
Joel Rudin recounts what he learned about various New York district 
attorneys’ offices as he brought civil § 1983 claims on behalf of criminal 
defendants who were convicted in cases where the prosecutors bringing the 
charges violated ethics rules.97  In his review of cases in three New York City 
boroughs, he found that neither the Queens, Bronx, nor Kings County District 
Attorney’s Office had consistent policies for reprimanding or disciplining 
attorneys in their offices who violated ethics obligations.98  More 
significantly, the only available sources that documented which attorneys 
violated policies or engaged in misconduct were judicial opinions.99  The 
offices themselves did not maintain any records of internal misconduct that 
monitored for minor policy infractions before the misconduct’s ramifications 
were so great that it surfaced in a judicial opinion.100  Further, in nearly all 
of the instances in which a prosecutor was reprimanded by the court, the 
office elected to defend the prosecutor, justify the misconduct, and appeal the 
case to a higher authority.101  While this demonstrates a willingness among 
prosecutors to “defend their own,” it also suggests a lack of accountability 
and a reluctance to acknowledge that there may be problematic prosecutors, 
training, or practices within an office.102  This failure to publicly and 
internally discipline may give the impression to prosecutors that the office 
providing their salaries supports their actions, even when a judge does not.103  
Judicial reliance on internal discipline is, therefore, potentially undermined 
by this culture, where internal supervisors are reluctant to admit 
wrongdoing.104 
Rudin’s findings through discovery in his own cases led to two significant 
revelations about internal discipline.  First, Rudin learned that none of these 
offices maintained a system for tracking attorneys who were informally or 
formally disciplined by the office or even which attorneys had been 
admonished or sanctioned by the judiciary.105  Second, the district attorneys 
in each office testified in depositions that their offices did not utilize any 
objective rubrics or guidelines to make clear to supervisors and line attorneys 
what the consequences of various violations are.106 
One significant consequence of failing to track when courts reprimand an 
attorney or when offices discipline their employees is that those offices are 
unable to appropriately discipline prosecutors after multiple infractions.107  
 
 96. See generally Rudin, supra note 1. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 572. 
 99. See, e.g., id. 
 100. See id. at 557. 
 101. See id. 
 102. Id.; see also Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 42, at 70. 
 103. Rudin, supra note 1, at 544, 566–67. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 554, 557–58, 567, 570–72. 
 107. Id. at 565, 567. 
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Therefore, these offices are unable to recognize when prosecutors are not 
receptive to increased training or refuse to adhere to internal ethical practices.  
For example, in the Queens County District Attorney’s Office, there was an 
ongoing illicit “Chinese wall” policy to shield prosecutors from knowing the 
existence or terms of any plea deals that their witnesses were guaranteed in 
exchange for testimony.108  This policy was designed so that if a witness were 
to falsely testify about receiving a plea deal in exchange for testimony, the 
examining prosecutor would not be liable for failing to interject and correct 
the misstatement.109  On at least one occasion, the chief of trials in the Queens 
District Attorney’s Office deliberately arranged for a witness’s attorney to be 
the party who conveyed a plea deal to the client so that the attorney-client 
privilege would shield that witness from testifying about the plea deal on 
cross-examination.110  This conduct was met with a “scathing opinion by the 
trial judge” when the witness’s attorney ultimately felt ethically compelled 
to reveal the scheme.111  The offending attorney, Chief of Trials Daniel 
McCarthy, however, was not chastised for his behavior and was later 
promoted to director of trial training.112 
In Jenkins v. Artuz,113 a federal judge found that a prosecutor had “engaged 
in a pattern of misconduct that was designed to conceal the existence of [a 
witness’s] cooperation agreement during [Jenkins’s] trial” and that this 
misconduct was “improper and, when considered cumulatively, severe.”114  
Ultimately, after the office appealed the judge’s finding of prejudicial 
misconduct, the district attorney’s office elected not to impose any internal 
discipline for this prosecutor but very shortly after promoted her.115 
These examples demonstrate a few instances in which courts have relied 
on prosecutors’ offices, as the vanguards of the profession, to take instances 
of misconduct seriously.116  However, in these case studies, there is little 
evidence that the offices required increased training or corrective measures 
or took punitive action against the offending attorneys.117 
II.  PMBR AS A TOOL TO ESTABLISH ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
PREVENT ETHICAL VIOLATIONS AND MISCONDUCT 
In the early 2000s, scholars and bar associations began evaluating systems 
of regulation, known as “proactive management-based regulation,” that 
prevent “ethical breaches.”  These regulatory systems target organizational 
controls and office policies instead of relying on the usual retroactive 
 
 108. Id. at 564–65. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 294 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 114. Id. at 290 (quoting Judgment at 27–28, Jenkins v. Artuz, No. 98-CV-00277 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 16, 2001)). 
 115. Rudin, supra note 1, at 566. 
 116. See generally id. 
 117. See id. at 572. 
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individual discipline that courts and state bar associations utilize.118  
Disciplinary boards under a PMBR system look at the “ethical infrastructure” 
of a firm and, if they find any deficiencies, discipline the law firm for failing 
to promote and demand ethical practices from its attorneys.119 
Part II of this Note provides background detailing how PMBR is developed 
and subsequently implemented in various legal systems.  This part also 
reviews the purposes of PMBR and how effective this style of regulation is 
at accomplishing its goals.  Part II.A specifically focuses on the theories and 
practical concerns that led various legal systems to adopt PMBR.  Part II.B 
then examines the processes that PMBR-based systems use to develop and 
implement their regulatory structures. 
A.  PMBR Protects Ethical Obligations in the Face of Divergent Practice 
Incentives 
Disciplinary authorities that choose to regulate the ethical infrastructure of 
law offices do so under the theory that authorities can more effectively reduce 
harm from misconduct by preventing the misconduct than by retroactively 
punishing lawyers after they err.120  The retroactive deterrent model is 
problematic because discipline only occurs after an attorney’s misconduct 
has caused noticeable harm, and it is only effective if punitive discipline is 
consistently and predictably enforced.121  Alternatively, proactive regulation 
of office infrastructure allows disciplinary boards to ensure that internal 
policies within a legal office are consistently enforced.122  Disciplinary 
authorities who utilize PMBR use this tool not to regulate individual 
attorneys but rather to mandate a hierarchical management structure that puts 
the onus on firms to promote ethical conduct in the office.123 
The general theory of proactive regulation is to prevent misconduct and to 
deter attorneys from sacrificing their ethical obligations as they pursue other 
goals.124  Most countries that have adopted proactive regulatory measures 
did so at the same time that their legal systems began allowing external, 
nonlawyer third parties to invest in law firms.125  Disciplinary authorities 
were concerned that pressure from investors would cause lawyers to sacrifice 
their ethical commitments to clients and accordingly wanted to ensure that 
firms had measures in place to help lawyers balance these conflicting 
forces.126  Disciplinary authorities were also concerned that investors might 
demand that firms behave in a certain way to increase profitability—for 
 
 118. Susan Saab Fortney, The Role of Ethics Audits in Improving Ethical Conduct in Law 
Firms:  An Empirical Examination, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 112, 
115 (2014). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Green & Levine, supra note 33, at 156–57. 
 122. See Fortney, supra note 118, at 115. 
 123. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 240. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 238–41; see also Fortney, supra note 118, at 116. 
 126. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 239–40. 
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example, by asking firms to put forward false testimony to win a contingency 
case, overbill clients for work, or take on cases with a conflict of interest to 
secure the income from the work.127  Even if there were no explicit requests 
for this behavior, authorities were concerned that the implicit pressure from 
third-party investors to increase revenue would cause attorneys to choose 
between two conflicting paths:  profitability versus ethical lawyering.128  
While investors could monitor profitability and respond when they were not 
satisfied, the regulatory state did not give ethics authorities the same ability 
to monitor for ethics violations or provide oversight.129  Disciplinary 
committees, in response, implemented proactive regulation and required 
firms to self-report on the policies their offices instituted that protected 
against unethical decision-making.130 
B.  Development and Implementation of Proactive Regulatory Measures 
Several international legal systems, including those of New South Wales, 
Australia; the United Kingdom; and Nova Scotia, Canada have used or are 
considering using PMBR in their ethics regulatory systems.131  In the United 
Kingdom and Australia, disciplinary authorities and regulators implement 
PMBR by mandating that firms appoint an ethical compliance officer in the 
firm who oversees governance, risk, and adherence to ethical rules.132  In the 
initial implementation, Australia required these ethics officers to complete a 
self-assessment process to evaluate their firms’ compliance with ten 
objectives set out by the disciplinary authorities.133  The Solicitors 
Regulation Authority (SRA) in the United Kingdom sets forth outcomes-
based regulation that operates very similarly to the ten objectives utilized in 
Australia.134  Other regulators, such as Nova Scotia’s Director of 
Professional Responsibility for the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, have 
recently recommended that their jurisdictions’ disciplinary authorities 
implement policies that would mirror those traditionally used in PMBR.135 
 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. at 242; see also Christine Parker et al., Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management:  
An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New South 
Wales, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 466, 475 (2010) (stating that the purpose of requiring firms to 
implement ethics management systems was “to counter any increased commercial pressure on 
the ethics of legal practice within [incorporated legal practices]”).  For more on how PMBR 
advances with consumer protection and improves avenues for recourse by clients who are 
unsatisfied by ethical conduct, see Susan Saab Fortney, Tales of Two Regimes for Regulating 
Limited Liability Law Firms in the U.S. and Australia:  Client Protection and Risk 
Management Lessons, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 230, 233–34 (2008). 
 131. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 236; see also Fortney, supra note 118, at 116–17. 
 132. Fortney, supra note 118, at 116–17. 
 133. See id. at 116–18; infra Part II.C. 
 134. For a discussion on the United Kingdom’s SRA Authorization Rules, see Fortney, 
supra note 118, at 116–21. 
 135. Id. at 126–27 (recommending the authority “adopt[] a proactive approach with lawyer 
[sic] and law firms through education, engagement, the creation of an appropriate management 
systems-based approach, and [adopt] the provision of tools and training to help firms of all 
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Scholarship about PMBR in the United States has led to changes in the 
Model Rules, such as the adoption of Model Rule 5.1, which requires partners 
in a law firm to make reasonable efforts to implement firm policies that 
ensure lawyers follow rules of professional conduct.136 
In countries with PMBR, there are two main features that help the system 
effectuate its more collaborative and proactive goals.137  First, these systems 
mandate that law practices appoint one internal attorney to be personally 
responsible for maintaining and assessing the firm’s ethical policies and 
infrastructure.138  Second, these systems create a collaborative environment 
for regulators and lawyers to help firms develop and maintain management 
systems that are more likely to help firms accomplish their ethical goals.139  
The “legal practitioner director” (LPD) ensures that the management systems 
are maintained and serve the firm’s ethical goals.140  The failure of these 
individuals to meet the specific duty of implementing the management 
systems is sanctionable and could potentially disqualify these individuals 
from serving as LPDs in the future.141 
In New South Wales, the LPD works with the firm to accomplish goals set 
out by an independent agency, the Office of the Legal Services 
Commissioner (OLSC),142 which is comprised of practitioners, the state 
malpractice insurer, and academics.143  In New South Wales, this 
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Changing Legal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 507–10 (2009); Welcome to 
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incorporated legal practices (ILP) submit self-assessments.  Regulatory authorities may still 
ensure that appropriate ethics systems are “implemented and maintained;” however, the OLSC 
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(Ron Levy et al. eds., 2017); Practice Management, OFF. OF THE LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R, 
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collaboration has led to ten priority areas for firms to address in their policies, 
which include:  (1) negligence; (2) communication; (3) delay; (4) liens and 
file transfers; (5) cost disclosure, billing practices, and termination of 
retainer; (6) conflicts of interest; (7) records management; (8) undertakings; 
(9) supervision of practice and staff; and (10) trust account regulations.144  
All firms must address these priority areas in their firm policies, but the 
OLSC allows each firm to tailor their policies so that they address these areas 
with procedures that make sense logistically for the needs of their offices.145 
The proactive nature of PMBR is reflected in requiring law firms and 
LPDs to report on the success of their firms’ management systems by 
completing self-assessments.146  These self-assessments require the firm to 
evaluate and lay out example scenarios to demonstrate what accomplishing 
each goal looks like at the firm.147  The LPD then measures whether the firm 
is compliant according to a five-degree scale:  (1) noncompliant, which 
means “[n]ot all Objectives have not been addressed”; (2) partially 
compliant, which means “[a]ll Objectives have been addressed but the 
management systems . . . are not fully functional”; (3) compliant, which 
means “[m]anagement systems for all Objectives exist and are fully 
functional”; (4) fully compliant, which means “[m]anagement systems exist 
for all Objectives and all are fully functional and all are regularly assessed 
for effectiveness”; and (5) fully compliant plus, which means “[a]ll 
Objectives have been addressed, all management systems are documented 
and all are fully functional and . . . assessed regularly for effectiveness plus 
improvements are made when needed.”148  While this process was in place, 
the OLSC received 294 of 300 self-assessment packages in the first year with 
overwhelmingly positive responses from firms, many of which found the 
assessment experience to have been “a valuable one.”149 
If a firm is not satisfactorily compliant,150 then the OLSC may audit the 
firm and provide the necessary tools to help the firm prepare for the audit 
 
https://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/Pages/lsc_practice_management/lsc_practice_management.asp
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 144. QUEENSLAND L. SOC’Y, GUIDE TO APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:  PRACTICE 
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 150. Id. at 513–14 (citing “a returned self assessment form with seven of the ten objectives 
rated as partially compliant,” “a returned self-assessment form with all of the ten objectives 
rated as non-compliant,” “a trust account inspection report which raised major issues with 
respect to supervision of employees and the veracity of the legal practitioner director’s 
certification,” and “sixty-five complaints made against an ILP with forty-nine complaints 
being made since incorporation in 2003” as reasons warranting an audit (footnotes omitted)). 
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process.151  These audits take a “positive, non-adversarial approach” and are 
designed so that the auditing agency assists firms rather than taking punitive 
measures.152 
III.  LACK OF PMBR THEORY IN U.S. PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 
Current methods of prosecutorial regulation in the United States certainly 
have some positive effect on regulating against prosecutorial misconduct.153  
However, these regulatory methods are primarily retroactive and do not have 
enough of a deterrent effect because courts and disciplinary authorities 
inconsistently and infrequently impose punitive sanctions.154  Proactive 
measures have historically reduced the amount of attorney misconduct in 
private practice by punishing policy failures and ensuring that offices have 
prophylactic policies that safeguard against misconduct before it affects 
clients.155  It is similarly problematic that these same measures are not used 
to safeguard against prosecutorial misconduct in our legal system.  It is 
probable that implementing PMBR-style measures in the United States 
would create a more satisfactory check on prosecutors. 
Part III.A of this Note examines what benefits PMBR might add to the 
existing regulatory and disciplinary structure for prosecutors.  Part III.B 
examines the practical challenges that may arise that would discourage the 
application of PMBR to prosecutors’ offices.  Part III.C of this Note reviews 
whether the U.S. legal system is structured in a way that gives judicially 
established disciplinary committees the authority to implement PMBR-style 
self-reporting requirements for prosecutors.156 
A.  A PMBR-Style Application of Model Rule 5.1 in Prosecutors’ Offices  
PMBR is not a novel idea in the United States.157  In 1992, the ABA’s 
Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement wrote a report, 
dedicated to former ABA president Robert McKay, which recommended that 
disciplinary committees create separate committees to help lawyers seeking 
assistance in ethical practices or law firm management without penalty.158  
Additionally, at least two states, Illinois and Colorado, have begun using 
PMBR for firms in private practice.  Illinois’s PMBR structure has been 
mandatory for attorneys in private practice since 2017.159  Colorado’s PMBR 
framework is a voluntary resource that is designed to help firms avoid 
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discipline and prevent misconduct.160  The ABA has also sought comments 
on a draft proposal to study and implement PMBR in the United States.161 
Proactive management-based efforts, at a minimum, would encourage the 
development of ethics policies that have thus far been missing from 
prosecutors’ offices.162  In cases where offices have been required to actively 
reflect on their internal policies and articulate how these policies 
accomplished preset goals, they were statistically more likely to initiate 
internal reform that helped their offices move closer to ethical compliance.163  
Alternatively, if offices found that they did not document guidance or 
policies in their offices, this requirement alerted the office to its failure to 
follow Model Rule 5.1, which had previously established managerial 
attorneys’ obligation to create policies.164 
1.  Regulatory Benefits of Enforcing Model Rule 5.1 Through PMBR 
PMBR has been a productive regulatory framework in the international 
private practice context.  Since the implementation of PMBR in New South 
Wales alone, complaints in relation to all legal practices fell about 5 percent 
annually according to at least one study.165  The same study demonstrated 
that complaint rates for lawyers dropped two-thirds after firms completed 
their initial self-assessments.166 
Results, however, were not limited to just the decrease in complaints.  In 
another evaluation conducted by Susan Fortney and Thalia Gordon, 84 
percent of respondent attorneys who had participated in the PMBR program 
in New South Wales reported that their offices had elected to revise their 
policies or procedures pertaining to delivery of legal services.167  Seventy-
one percent stated explicitly that they had done so in connection with the 
completion of the self-assessment process.168  Additionally, 47 percent of the 
respondents reported that their firms adopted entirely new systems, policies, 
and procedures in response to the self-assessments.169 
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Results from Professor Fortney’s study not only analyzed what actions 
firms took after their self-assessments but also examined the impact that the 
assessments had on firms’ management, professional concerns, ethics 
concerns, and morale.170  In this study, which examined PMBR results in 
Australia, the self-assessments demonstrated that proactive regulation had 
the greatest impact on “Firm Management,” “Risk Management,” and 
“Supervision”—the three metrics studied that related to managerial 
oversight.171 
In another evaluation of firms that underwent the PMBR self-evaluation 
process in New South Wales, the complaint rate for self-assessed firms 
dropped two-thirds compared to pre-assessment rates.172  These complaint 
rates decreased regardless of how the firm scored itself on its compliance 
ratings.173  The authors of this study inferred that the self-assessment process 
was the cause of the decrease in complaints, not the actual compliance 
levels.174 
While these international results may not entirely predict how PMBR 
would be received in the United States in prosecutorial work, the overall 
statistical evidence demonstrates that attorneys and offices are willing to 
reexamine policies or even entirely overhaul old protocols in exchange for 
new systems.175 
2.  Cost Savings of PMBR  
While PMBR would require the review of new material and an initial 
development stage where disciplinary committees establish a self-reporting 
program, proactive regulatory efforts have historically been less expensive 
than formal hearings and reviews.176  Long-term efforts to reduce 
misconduct, such as diversion programs in the United States, have 
historically saved disciplinary committees time and money so long as they 
effectively helped deter future misconduct.177  In the short term, these 
programs cost less than processing complaints and conducting formal 
disciplinary procedures.178  It is likely that long-term proactive efforts would 
have the same effect on cost.179 
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B.  The Plausible Challenges of Applying a PMBR-Based Model Rule 5.1 
There are also potential hindrances to implementing PMBR, specifically 
as a system for regulating prosecutors.  Most saliently, these obstacles 
include increased time requirements and cost requirements associated with 
new regulation, prosecutors’ own resistance to regulation that may alter their 
legal practices, the difficulties in adapting PMBR to the varied types of 
prosecutors’ offices, and potential infringement on separation of powers. 
1.  The Cost of Compliance 
One concern with a PMBR-based approach to Model Rule 5.1 is that it 
would increase the ethical burden on prosecutors’ offices and divert 
resources from prosecution to “red tape” ethical checks on conduct.  
Compliance with Model Rule 5.1 would require first the appointment of a 
senior, supervisory attorney who would be responsible for developing, 
drafting, promulgating, and reporting on the office’s self-reporting 
measures.180  This would require the office to expend resources annually to 
redevelop policies and complete ethics compliance paperwork.181 
It is possible, however, that efforts to self-report on these measures would 
be minimal, so long as prosecutors comply with the preexisting Model Rule 
5.1.182  The increased cost or effort involved in developing new policies 
would stem from their preexisting Model Rule 5.1 burdens and not from any 
new obligation to create policies.183  There would also be increased burdens 
that result from the process of conforming documented infractions and 
policies to match self-reporting forms. 
2.  Prosecutors’ Resistance to Public Self-Reporting 
For any self-review mechanism and regulation to be effective, lawyers 
need to be motivated to fully utilize them.  Empirical studies by Susan 
Fortney have demonstrated that one concern lawyers have with conducting 
internal reviews of policies for disciplinary committees are that these reviews 
could be used as evidence in malpractice claims against private firm 
attorneys.184  For prosecutors, the parallel concern would be that criminal 
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defendants would use these reviews as evidence in § 1983 claims or in 
conviction appeals when the basis for the appeal is some form of 
prosecutorial misconduct.185  Therefore, prosecutors’ offices may adamantly 
oppose or lobby against making such disclosures in order to shield 
themselves from liability.  While the primary goal of a PMBR-style 
enforcement of Model Rule 5.1 would be to improve internal compliance and 
advise offices, if prosecutors’ offices refused to make fulsome disclosures or 
repeatedly failed to produce complaint reports, then disciplinary committees 
could leverage their enforcement arms to demand compliance or sanction the 
supervisory attorneys. 
3.  Challenges Affecting Broad Implementation of PMBR 
Beyond the hurdle of implementing the infrastructure in disciplinary 
committees, any steps taken to implement PMBR should account for the 
nuances and idiosyncratic characteristics of various types of prosecutors’ 
offices.  For example, prosecutors’ offices have varying concerns depending 
on the populations they serve, the type of prosecutors they employ, and the 
activities of each office.186 
For example, rural prosecutors’ offices that only employ one attorney as 
the prosecutor, or employ part-time prosecutors, will not have the same 
record-keeping techniques as a larger office that may employ hundreds of 
attorneys.187  Alternatively, the hierarchical supervision that larger offices 
may require to support junior attorneys is certainly not useful in offices with 
only one prosecutor.188  However, these smaller offices still require that 
prosecutors be methodical and systematic in approaching prosecutions, 
especially since they do not have colleagues who can provide feedback on 
their work or check any biases they have.189  In these offices, sole 
practitioners are simultaneously subject to any policies they have mandated 
and must also self-regulate in the truest sense, as their own compliance 
officers.  It is not unrealistic or unduly burdensome to require individuals to 
assess their own policies and procedures against objective criteria so that an 
individual can assess whether the practices advance goals set out by the state 
disciplinary committee. 
Contrastingly, in urban areas, internal policies that require hierarchical 
oversight are likely too large to adopt cumbersome, individualized reviews 
that may be implemented in smaller offices with flat structures or single 
prosecutors.  Because of the variety among prosecutors’ offices, disciplinary 
committees would need to ensure that the requirements for management 
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policies “allow[] firms the room to establish appropriate management 
systems that suit the nature of their clientele.”190 
4.  Regulation of Areas with High Prosecutorial Discretion 
There is a clear tradition of separation of powers between the judiciary and 
executive branch, and prosecutors function within the executive branch’s law 
enforcement powers.191  Implementation of a self-reporting system in which 
prosecutors must submit a report of their internal policies to the judiciary 
may edge close to blurring the line of this separation of powers.192  
Prosecutors are granted the authority to make discretionary decisions and are 
immune from liability and oversight for those discretionary decisions.193  
Because prosecutors regularly face complex ethical dilemmas, courts often 
defer to their prosecutorial judgment and decline to sanction all but the most 
flagrant violations and misconduct.194  If prosecutors were required to report 
to judicially created disciplinary committees and required to obtain approval 
before implementing office policies guiding when to charge a defendant or 
when to offer a plea deal, the judicial branch might well be infringing on 
prosecutors’ exclusively executive decision-making power.195 
Model Rule 5.1, however, does not mandate what policies or what specific 
decisions prosecutors ultimately make in carrying out their duties.196  Rather, 
Model Rule 5.1 specifies only that prosecutors “ensure that the firm has in 
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm 
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”197  Disciplinary committees, 
under this Model Rule 5.1 framework, would need to ensure that prosecutors 
explicitly report the policies they have in place and that offices have a 
systematic way to evaluate whether their policies ensure that lawyers 
conform to rules of professional conduct.  However, committees would not 
need to demand that prosecutors implement any specific policies or specific 
language in order to ensure compliance.198 
C.  Can Disciplinary Committees Use Model Rule 5.1 to Integrate PMBR? 
Prosecutors today, as previously stated, are primarily regulated through 
judicial orders or disciplinary committee sanctions that demand deterrent 
punitive action.199  However, authorities rarely impose disciplinary 
measures, and when authorities do order sanctions, those sanctions rarely 
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have substantive consequences.200  The Model Rules, which explicitly detail 
ethics rules for all lawyers, are a clear and readily accessible articulation of 
conduct policies that have been widely implemented and accepted, with 
variations, in each jurisdiction.201  These rules all include a version of Model 
Rule 5.1, which demands that managerial attorneys guarantee that their 
offices adopt measures that ensure compliance with the rules of professional 
conduct and ethical obligations.202 
The universally adopted Model Rule 5.1 gives disciplinary committees the 
authority to evaluate a supervisory attorney’s Model Rule 5.1 obligations.203  
This authority specifically measures whether the managerial attorney has 
guaranteed that the office has adopted measures that ensure compliance with 
the professional rules.204  In the nearly universally incorporated comments to 
Model Rule 5.1, managerial lawyers must make reasonable efforts to 
establish internal policies and procedures that meet certain basic ethics 
standards.205  The comments specifically say that all legal offices should 
have policies that “detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by 
which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and 
property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.”206 
However, there is still a cloud of uncertainty around certain aspects of the 
implementation and enforcement of Model Rule 5.1 and the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct generally.  For example, while it is broadly accepted 
that the rules are grounded in legitimate authority, it is unclear what degree 
of authority judiciary committees have in guaranteeing that their rules are 
being adhered to.207  Additionally, although Model Rule 5.1 clearly states 
what a managerial lawyer’s obligations are, it is unclear how these rules have 
affected management efforts or prevented lawyers’ misconduct in 
practice.208  Furthermore, while disciplinary committees have rules in place 
that permit them to file disciplinary actions against attorneys who fail in their 
obligations under Model Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a), it is not apparent that 
disciplinary committees have the procedures, resources, or mechanisms to 
discover these violations in practice.209  It is possible that disciplinary 
committees could begin taking proactive measures by enforcing Model Rule 
5.1 for prosecutors’ offices, particularly in light of comments to Model Rule 
5.1, by requiring a proactive assessment of internal policies. 
Disciplinary committees could provide oversight by establishing new 
committees or tasking existing committees, such as the ABA Criminal 
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Justice Standards Committee,210 to help develop goals for prosecutors’ 
offices generally.  This process would function similarly to how New South 
Wales’s OLSC coordinated with practitioners, academics, and prosecutors to 
identify problem areas for the field and then set out goals that prosecutors’ 
offices should seek to accomplish.211 
As discussed in Part I.C, for PMBR to be effectively implemented in 
prosecutors’ offices, the judiciary would need to guarantee that a neutral 
committee with varied perspectives could collectively outline goals for 
prosecutors’ offices.  This committee could operate as a branch of the ABA, 
which already utilizes collective groups of various legal professionals to 
develop rulemaking ideas and assess the legal ethical landscape, as a unique 
committee established by state supreme courts or by each disciplinary 
counsel.212 
Before evaluating the mechanisms that offices have to guarantee ethical 
compliance, the bar must determine what types of misconduct it wants to 
remedy in order to protect constitutional due process for criminal defendants 
and ensure ethical legal practice by prosecutors.213  Historically, prosecutors 
have strongly argued that only flagrant and intentional misconduct by 
individual prosecutors should be sanctioned and that this misconduct is too 
infrequent to warrant reform efforts.214  The prosecutor’s perspective is that 
negligence is mere “error”215 and that prosecutors who are not “adept as a 
result of [their] inexperience” and who “inadvertently” commit professional 
misconduct should not be subject to punitive treatment.216  This perspective 
suggests that negligent action should be corrected through rehabilitative 
measures, such as increased training and oversight. 
The more contemporary push toward criminal justice reform and research 
has highlighted, however, that negligent or reckless prosecutions have the 
same effect on the wronged criminal defendants.217  While this may not 
necessitate individual reprimands and sanctioning for entry-level attorneys 
who misstep, it does require more broadly that prosecutors’ offices take 
ownership of their training and infrastructure to safeguard against negligent 
prosecutorial action.218  More significantly, because prosecutors’ offices 
historically lack consistent internal discipline and training,219 bar 
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associations that mandate ethical infrastructure in prosecutors’ offices may 
create broadly applied and consistently implemented safeguards against 
negligent prosecutions or negligent decisions. 
PMBR provides disciplinary authorities and law offices with an additional 
tool to help prevent negligent misconduct because it targets higher-level 
negligence in training and inadequate policies.  In offices where supervisors 
overlook repeat errors, attorneys have historically continued to practice 
without correction or consequences.  Proactive policies that require offices 
to keep records and track sanctions or judicial reprimands would help 
supervising attorneys identify which attorneys need more training and in 
which areas.  This increased training and record-keeping could help mitigate 
future misconduct or errors by those attorneys or, if attorneys are resistant to 
correcting their errors, reduce firm liability.  PMBR measures that examine 
and evaluate whether office policies reduce negligent behavior may reduce 
the tension between concerns that individual prosecutors should not be 
punished for negligence with the reality that negligent prosecutions still 
result in unjust outcomes. 
This Note proposes that disciplinary committees identify three categories 
of compliance goals:  (1) prosecutor-specific rules, (2) general ethics rules, 
and (3) appropriate internal management policies.  Disciplinary committee 
goals must be clearly written but must also be general enough to give each 
office the resources to craft its own policies that accomplish the goals in a 
way that corresponds with its preexisting office management policies.220 
Goals for prosecutor-specific rules should aim to prevent issues including, 
but not limited to, incomplete discovery disclosures and Brady violations, 
constitutionally impermissible and unfair plea deals for witnesses and 
defendants, improper summations at trial, and improper charging decisions.  
These goals may also include measures that ensure general guidance, 
training, and oversight of the exercise of discretion.  Measures within this 
category are only relevant or applicable to attorneys who work in the 
prosecutorial role, and often these rules are defined through precedential case 
law. 
The general ethics rules should encompass policies that apply to all 
lawyers in the office’s jurisdiction, such as those specifically commented on 
in Model Rule 5.1.221  These goals include protecting client confidentiality, 
establishing proper record maintenance, avoiding conflicts of interest, candor 
toward tribunals, and avoiding false testimony, among others.222  Many of 
these rules are formalized in each state’s code of ethics, and since they apply 
to all attorneys, they must also apply to those attorneys who serve as 
prosecutors. 
Finally, disciplinary committees should also set out goals that relate to 
internal management.  Due to the lack of consistent policies and failures to 
correct, retrain, or censure prosecutors internally, disciplinary committees 
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must demand that submissions reflect the importance of internal record-
keeping and objective internal disciplinary procedures.  There are rarely 
policies in place that track misconduct, public censure by the judiciary, 
reprimands by disciplinary committees, or internally discovered 
misconduct.223  Disciplinary committees must require that offices ferret out 
persistently negligent or egregiously errant prosecutors by tracking 
misconduct—whether it is uncovered by judges or internal investigations.  
Offices must also have policies in place to either discipline, retrain, or 
terminate prosecutors who fail to conform to compliance policies.  
Additionally, offices should create internal incentives, whether 
compensation-based or otherwise, that promote justice-seeking prosecutions 
as opposed to conviction-seeking ones.224 
After setting out these goals, disciplinary committees could move forward 
to have the local prosecutors’ offices in their jurisdictions appoint attorneys 
to have the compliance-related role of developing and implementing ethics 
infrastructure in their offices.  Their ethics responsibility would be, primarily, 
to ensure that each office has compliant policies that are reported to 
disciplinary counsel, but the mechanisms that their offices utilize would 
consider the size, resources, and preexisting policies of each office.225  
Disciplinary committees could then require those offices to report with a self-
assessment annually on an objective scale to denote their compliance with 
policies on a form modeled after those used abroad.226  Disciplinary 
committees could also use this self-assessment process as an opportunity to 
provide guidance to offices who are developing newly compliant policies.  
This collaborative, advisory function would allow for a dialogue and 
investigation into best practices and would allow prosecutors to receive 
tailored advice on how to ensure compliance in their offices. 
The obvious next concern is:  what if a prosecutor’s office produces 
noncompliant results and fails to meet these preset goals in its self-reported 
assessment?  Preliminarily, if an office fails to report that the office complied 
with the ethics obligations under Model Rule 5.1, the consequence would be 
that the supervising attorney would be personally disciplined for failure to 
abide by Model Rules 5.1(a)–(c).  According to Model Rule 5.1(c), a lawyer 
is responsible for another lawyer’s violations if “the lawyer . . . ratifies the 
conduct involved”227 or “knows of the conduct at a time when its 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable 
remedial action.”228  However, Model Rule 5.1(a) most clearly establishes 
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the liability of the lawyer who has “comparable managerial authority [to a 
partner in a firm]” if the firm fails to establish reasonable measures ensuring 
compliance with rules of professional conduct.229  In a prosecutor’s office, 
the managerial lawyer is the chief prosecutor and all other prosecutors who 
hold “managerial or executive functions in the office.”230  This allocation of 
liability is appropriate given that the highest-ranking person also has the 
greatest ability to establish custom and policy. 
Alternatively, disciplinary committees may elect to audit offices that have 
failed to comply or have consistently demonstrated in self-reports that their 
policies did not successfully advance ethics goals.231  These audits, in the 
international context, examined the existence of policies and the success of 
those policies in deterring misconduct.232  The audits did not second-guess 
attorney decision-making for trial or counseling strategy.233  Rather, the 
audits would monitor whether lawyers adhere to their internal policies, 
whether the policies are consistently implemented, and whether the policies 
effectively target the ethics goals set out by the disciplinary committees. 
IV.  PMBR AS A SOLUTION TO PROACTIVELY REDUCE PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT  
As a solution, this Note proposes that disciplinary committees enforce 
Model Rule 5.1 in a proactive manner by implementing PMBR regulatory 
schemes.  Model Rule 5.1 already requires that managerial attorneys ensure 
their offices have policies in place that reasonably guarantee compliance with 
the rules; however, few disciplinary committees leverage Model Rule 5.1 as 
a way to improve ethical infrastructure or take disciplinary action for Model 
Rule 5.1 violations.  Additionally, various legal systems have adopted PMBR 
systems that require attorneys to self-assess their internal ethics policies 
against a rubric of ethics goals and report to local authorities whether their 
policies advance those goals.  This Note suggests a disciplinary approach in 
which disciplinary committees meaningfully enforce Model Rule 5.1 by 
requiring prosecutors to demonstrate that their offices have established 
policies guaranteeing compliance with various ethics obligations.  I propose 
these obligations include prosecutor-specific regulations, general ethics 
obligations, and internal management requirements. However, this Note 
recommends that disciplinary committees begin using and enforcing Model 
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Rule 5.1 through a proactive framework, rather than offering specific policies 
that offices should adopt.  This decision stems from an acknowledgement of 
the complexities involved in choosing precise preventative measures that 
work effectively.  Expert research and collaborative committees that unify 
interested parties and comprehensively evaluate specific policies are 
necessary to develop a system that works.  Best practices may also arise after 
an advisory trial and error period after disciplinary committees begin to adopt 
Model Rule 5.1 PMBR-style regulation and evaluate the success of their 
systems. 
The U.S. legal system already has in place an underutilized infrastructure 
demanding that managerial attorneys establish internal protocols 
guaranteeing lawyers will follow the rules.234  This obligation, established 
under Model Rule 5.1, requires that attorneys, including prosecutors, 
guarantee that lawyers create policies that ensure compliance with various 
ethical obligations, such as confidentiality concerns, conflict of interest 
issues, disclosing exculpatory evidence in discovery, among others.235 
As previously discussed, ethical infrastructure has been implemented in 
one of two ways.236  In some countries, disciplinary committees emphasize 
ethical infrastructure as a precatory and optional tool for law firms to 
voluntarily adopt.  In these frameworks, disciplinary committees essentially 
exist with open-door policies so that lawyers can go to disciplinary counsel 
for practice management guidance.237  Alternatively, PMBR is implemented 
so that disciplinary authorities require attorneys to appoint compliance 
counsel, evaluate their offices’ policies against disciplinary bodies’ goals, 
and conduct self-assessments that they submit to disciplinary authorities.238  
Similarly, Model Rule 5.1 requires, first, that managers have in place some 
internal policies regarding ethics but second, that managers must ensure the 
policies reasonably guarantee compliance with ethical obligations.239  
Disciplinary committees could meaningfully enforce Model Rule 5.1 with a 
PMBR application that would theoretically only add a requirement that 
prosecutors’ offices submit the policies that they have already established. 
This solution would help prevent misconduct because disciplinary 
committees, which are tasked with enforcing compliance with disciplinary 
rules, often do not have the information needed to unearth misconduct absent 
a complaint.240  Unsophisticated criminal defendants do not traditionally 
seek information about formal or informal internal policies during discovery 
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in § 1983 claims against prosecutors’ offices.  When defendants do move 
forward in these cases, they are met with the nearly insurmountable task of 
proving that the prosecutor’s office was “deliberately indifferent” to its need 
to train prosecutors.241  In several cases, discovery in § 1983 claims did 
uncover the failure of the office to keep records or establish policies that 
would educate attorneys about their ethical duties.242  However, there were 
no § 1983 claims or other civil liability claims brought against any of these 
offices that implicated Model Rule 5.1 violations.243 
Disciplinary committees, therefore, should proactively seek out offices 
that do not adequately train their prosecutors, do not supervise their 
prosecutors, or do not know what their prosecutors are doing.  By adopting 
pieces of PMBR, disciplinary committees could proactively safeguard 
against misconduct and improve the criminal justice system.244  Disciplinary 
committees could employ a self-reporting system requiring prosecutors’ 
offices to assess the degree to which their internal protocols guarantee that 
their line attorneys comply with their obligations.  Then, if policies do not 
adequately safeguard against misconduct, disciplinary committees would not 
mandate that the office adopt certain protocols.  Instead, per each court’s 
rules,245 disciplinary committees would sanction the top supervisory 
prosecutors and require that the office adopt some rule that more effectively 
guarantees that lawyers are both aware of and act according to their 
responsibilities. 
PMBR has historically been implemented internationally to overcome the 
possible pressures from third-party investors for firms to behave in ways that 
increase profitability at the expense of client care.246  The empirical success 
of PMBR in legal practices where lawyers have internally divergent interests 
demonstrates that PMBR may also be a tool that safeguards against 
prosecutorial misconduct.247  Prosecutors face similar contradicting 
pressures and are simultaneously asked to be zealous advocates that seek 
convictions and guilty pleas but who must also be fair-minded agents of 
justice.248  PMBR, as a proactive tool, would likely help prosecutors’ offices 
balance these conflicting pressures and ensure that, despite any internal 
pressure to seek convictions, there are still safeguards that protect ethics in 
prosecutions. 
This system would need to overcome the hurdle of clearly identifying 
which goals prosecutors must use to evaluate their policies.249  As noted 
above, research has demonstrated that prosecutors are typically bound by 
 
 241. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011). 
 242. See generally Rudin, supra note 1. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See supra Part II.A. 
 245. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 246. See Schneyer, supra note 63, at 235. 
 247. See Schneyer, supra note 172, at 624–25. 
 248. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that prosecutors must “refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction” but also “use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one”). 
 249. See supra Part II.A. 
726 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
three types of rules, and disciplinary committees should mandate that 
prosecutors’ offices abide by:  (1) prosecutor-specific rules, (2) general 
ethical rules, and (3) appropriate internal management policies and rules.250  
Prosecutor-specific goals are codified in the widely adopted ABA Model 
Rule 3.8 but also could be more clearly articulated by a committee that 
reviews case law and public policy to more clearly delineate the basic 
obligations that internal policies must address.  Additionally, because the 
current disciplinary landscape often relies on an assumption that prosecutors’ 
offices will discipline prosecutors who violate the rules,251 disciplinary 
committees should also require management policies so that prosecutors 
develop clear, systematic, and consistently applied internal policies for 
punishing infractions.252 
When developing the goals that prosecutors’ offices must strive to achieve, 
disciplinary committees should not require specific policies.  Demanding 
specific policies would prevent prosecutors’ offices from tailoring their 
policies to the needs of their jurisdictions or offices.  This type of 
micromanagement would likely defeat the purpose of self-improvement and 
organic growth in the office.253  Furthermore, overregulating prosecutors 
with specific policy requirements may also raise concerns of breaching the 
separation of powers since disciplinary committees are agents of the judiciary 
and prescribing certain policies would dictate how prosecutors perform their 
duties.  Instead, disciplinary committees would need to allow prosecutors’ 
offices to develop individualized implementation of the objective criteria. 
To address another concern, authorities should not decline to employ 
PMBR because of a concern that prosecutors would fail to report on internal 
policies honestly.  Prosecutors’ offices are government agencies and there is 
a strong public interest in government transparency.254  The disclosure of 
internal policies and record-keeping practices would further this interest of 
transparency,255 but this disclosure would simultaneously force prosecutors 
to honestly self-report.  Judges in practice could see if prosecutors are 
complying with their policies where relevant, but more significantly, internal 
employees of the office would know whether the reporting was truthful or 
not.  These employees would have a duty to correct any dishonest reporting 
and hold their own offices accountable. 
Additionally, disclosure of prosecutorial misconduct records and the 
consequent measures that prosecutors’ offices take to safeguard against 
misconduct is in the public interest of transparency.256  The public should be 
informed about these issues, because if it is unsatisfied with a prosecutor’s 
office’s protocols, then it should have the opportunity to express this 
 
 250. See supra Part II.A. 
 251. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 252. See supra Part II.A. 
 253. Fortney & Gordon, supra note 162, at 172. 
 254. Jamie Connolly, Prosecutorial Discretion and Collateral Consequences:  Rethinking 
the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, 43 J. LEGAL PRO. 269, 273 (2019). 
 255. See id. 
 256. See supra Part II.B. 
2020] PROACTIVE REGULATION OF PROSECTORS 727 
dissatisfaction at the polls by voting for new elected officials—either elected 
prosecutors or legislators—who can effectuate change in prosecutorial 
conduct.  The purpose of publicly disclosing policies and misconduct records 
is not necessarily to put the public on notice about which attorneys are “bad 
prosecutors” but rather to provide the public with the assurance that 
prosecutors’ offices have systematic policies that track and punish various 
types of misconduct and that these policies are effective.  Therefore, 
disclosure and self-reporting should not require prosecutors’ offices to 
specifically state who received discipline or demerits but, instead, to report 
on the number of incidents of misconduct and noncompliance and the 
responses that their offices had to those instances. 
The benefits of a PMBR program, including, first and foremost, a revision 
and reestablishment of internal policies in prosecutors’ offices, outweigh the 
potential challenges that regulators may face when implementing PMBR.257  
Even if managerial prosecutors, through the self-evaluation process, learn 
that their offices are not fully compliant, the reflection on and review of 
policies may lead to greater efforts to move towards compliance.258  
Furthermore, evaluation of office policies allows disciplinary authorities to 
address internal protocols that permit negligent prosecutions.259  While 
negligent actions by prosecutors are regularly not punished by courts or 
disciplinary committees, these actions still have serious ramifications for 
innocent criminal defendants.260  By allowing disciplinary committees to 
assess the extent to which internal policies permit negligence, regulatory 
authorities can reduce the consequences of negligent trial tactics while not 
individually attacking the errant attorney.261 
Even though there are concerns about judicial overreach into a primarily 
executive branch law enforcement function, PMBR is a tool that allows for 
judicial committees to merely inquire into the existence and efficacy of 
internal policies.  Disciplinary committees should not have the opportunity 
to second-guess prosecutorial decision-making.262  For example, there is a 
clear distinction between a disciplinary committee ensuring that 
discretionary decisions like plea bargains are made with oversight, 
justification, and training and a disciplinary committee forbidding a 
prosecutor’s office from offering pleas to certain individuals.263 
Additionally, implementation of this self-reporting under Model Rule 5.1 
should not be a significant enough burden to prevent a PMBR approach.  
While there may be initial costs involved in adapting policies to a self-
reporting form and a reevaluation of policies in light of specific ethics goals, 
most offices should not have to undertake the process of developing 
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guidebooks and policies.264  These processes should already be established 
per Model Rule 5.1.  If an office does not have these policies in place, the 
benefit of establishing consistent, promulgated guidance and training to 
attorneys outweighs the burdens of any time or cost required to develop these 
policies. 
Overall, this is a suggestion that disciplinary committees could import 
PMBR to U.S. legal practice to provide more oversight of prosecutorial 
conduct.  It is clear that, while many prosecutors execute their jobs without 
issue, the consequences of misconduct are so substantial and misconduct 
happens with enough frequency that increased regulatory efforts are 
necessary.265  In an ideal scenario, implementation of proactive regulation 
and self-reporting on internal policies would provide another check to assist 
prosecutors’ offices in developing management techniques that sufficiently 
train their employees on how to be agents of justice.  If, however, issues arise 
in the implementation and integration of this proactive technique, this 
practice is not irreversible.  This Note submits that the adoption of proactive 
regulation and self-reporting in accordance with Model Rule 5.1 is a 
worthwhile endeavor that would, at minimum, increase prosecutors’ 
reflections on their own legal practices, help prevent misconduct, and help 
facilitate an equitable legal system that protects the constitutional right of due 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
There are currently several mechanisms to combat and deter prosecutorial 
misconduct in our legal system, including judicial orders, civil litigation by 
defendants, disciplinary committee actions, and internal discipline.  
However, these regulatory mechanisms all approach the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct with a retrospective, deterrence approach, which 
has thus far been successfully countered and undermined by various external 
factors.  Ultimately, none of these avenues has successfully prevented 
misconduct to the degree that society demands. 
If disciplinary committees began enforcing Model Rule 5.1 proactively, 
case studies in other jurisdictions suggest that offices would reevaluate their 
policies with a more pointed and rigorous review of ethical compliance.  This 
approach does not create new ethical obligations for prosecutors, since 
Model Rule 5.1 already demands that supervising attorneys guarantee 
compliance with the rule.  Additionally, because the proposed style of PMBR 
does not require a submission of which attorneys committed misconduct but, 
rather, a report of the office policies that are in place and a summary of their 
efficacy, this regulatory reporting would not infringe on prosecutors’ 
discretionary decision-making in the office.  Instead, prosecutors merely 
need to confirm for disciplinary authorities that their offices have in place a 
system to ensure compliance with prosecutorial obligations, general ethics 
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obligations, and a recording system that internally tracks misconduct, 
sanctions, discipline, and education for attorneys who violate rules. 
Ultimately, by rereading Model Rule 5.1 as an enforcement tool for 
disciplinary committees by adopting proactive management-based self-
reporting requirements, these judicial committees may help prevent serious 
prosecutorial misconduct instead of merely punishing prosecutors only after 
their misconduct has already deprived some person of protected rights. 
